The Fed is readying to punish banks for holding Bitcoin as US crypto tensions boil over

The next big Bitcoin policy fight may have nothing to do with ETFs or government legislation, but with a dry Federal Reserve capital proposal that most investors will never read.

The landscape is simple: will big banks continue to treat Bitcoin as a balance sheet hazard, or will US capital rules begin to leave room for more serious bank intermediation around it?

With the Fed expected to vote next week on a revised Basel proposal and then open a 90-day comment window, this little-noticed rulemaking could become one of the most important banking decisions for Bitcoin in years.

Reuters reported on Mar. 12 that the Fed plans to vote next week on a revised Basel proposal for large banks and then open a 90-day public comment period.

Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle Bowman said the same day that proposals covering Basel III and the G-SIB surcharge would be published in the coming week.

Most crypto investors do not care about prudential terminology, but they do care about whether their bank will eventually offer better Bitcoin services, whether crypto firms can more easily secure bank relationships, and whether Wall Street integration expands beyond ETFs.

The current Basel framework is restrictive enough to make those questions materially harder for banks to answer.

This all comes amid increasing tension between the US crypto industry and banks as they continue to clash over the stalled Clarity Act. The President chose a side this month by directly blaming banks for the delay.

What Basel says now

Under the Basel crypto framework, banks’ crypto exposures are split into Group 1 and Group 2, with the latter being the tougher bucket.

A Group 2 cryptoasset is treated as Group 2b unless a bank demonstrates to its supervisor that it meets Group 2a hedging recognition criteria. Group 2b exposures carry a 1250% risk weight, and Basel says that treatment is calibrated so that banks hold minimum risk-based capital equal to the value of those exposures.

Basel also says total Group 2 exposure is built around 1% and 2% of Tier 1 capital thresholds: banks are expected to stay under 1%, excess over 1% gets the harsher Group 2b treatment, and if exposure exceeds 2%, all Group 2 exposure gets the Group 2b treatment.

A bank with $100 billion in Tier 1 capital is expected to keep total Group 2 crypto exposure below roughly $1 billion. If it exceeded $2 billion, all Group 2 exposure would be subject to the harsher Group 2b treatment.

For the largest banks, that is enough room to experiment, but not enough to make Bitcoin a normal balance-sheet asset under the current framework.

Basel’s framework allows a Group 2a path for cryptoassets that meet hedging recognition criteria, including the existence of regulated exchange-traded derivatives or ETFs/ETNs, as well as minimum liquidity thresholds.

For Group 2a, the framework uses a modified market risk treatment with a 100% risk weight on the net position, rather than the 1250% treatment for Group 2b.

Basel’s default treatment of unbacked crypto is punitive, and unless banks qualify for the narrower 2a path, direct exposure remains extremely expensive.

Permission versus capital

Capital rules determine what banks can do economically, not just what they can do legally.

If the capital treatment remains harsh, large banks will still have a strong incentive to avoid meaningful Bitcoin inventory, financing, principal market-making, and other balance sheet-intensive services.

If it softens, or if the US draft provides a clearer, more usable path for lower-risk treatment, the long-run effect could be more bank custody, financing, execution, and infrastructure for Bitcoin.

The US has already been reopening the banking side of crypto. In March 2025, the OCC reaffirmed that crypto custody, certain stablecoin activities, and participation in independent node verification networks are permissible for national banks, and it scrapped a prior non-objection hurdle.

In April 2025, the Fed and FDIC withdrew two 2023 joint statements on cryptoasset-related activities and said banks may engage in permissible crypto activities consistent with safety and soundness.

In December 2025, the OCC said banks could act as intermediaries in “riskless principal” crypto transactions.

That means the policy bottleneck is increasingly shifting from permission to capital.

Washington may be opening the legal door to crypto banking while still leaving the economic door mostly shut. Banks may be allowed to touch crypto in more ways than they were two years ago.

However, if Basel implementation leaves Bitcoin in the harsh bucket, big banks still have little reason to scale meaningful balance sheet exposure.

Global context

In November 2025, the Basel Committee said it would expedite a targeted review of its cryptoasset standard, and in February 2026, it said it had discussed progress on that review.

A BIS speech in December 2025 said bank exposures to cryptoassets stood at just over €14 billion at end-2024 and remained limited enough that the banking industry had been “largely immune” to crypto’s price swings.

That makes the current US debate more interesting: crypto-bank integration remains limited, and capital treatment is one reason why.

Basel’s own text states that, on a segregated basis, some crypto-related custodial services generally do not give rise to credit, market, or liquidity requirements in the same way as direct exposures. However, they still raise operational risk and supervisory issues.

So the biggest effect of harsh capital treatment is on principal risk and scalable balance sheet activity.

In essence, the current case is a conflict between two visions of Bitcoin.

One says Bitcoin should remain something banks service only at the margins. The other says Bitcoin should eventually become bankable infrastructure: financed, custodied, hedged, and intermediated inside the same institutions that already handle other major asset classes.

Next week’s Fed proposal will show which direction US prudential policy is leaning.

Potential outcomes

The bull case is that the US draft creates a more workable path for certain hedged or lower-risk Bitcoin exposures, or at least signals a willingness to interpret Basel’s crypto framework in a less punitive way than many in the market currently assume.

In that version, banks gain more room for custody-plus-financing, market-making, and other institutional services around Bitcoin rather than suddenly loading up on it. Bitcoin became more bankable without being formally embraced.

The bear case is that the proposal operationalizes the harsh treatment cleanly and visibly, leaving banks with little ambiguity and little room to scale.

In that case, the 90-day comment window becomes a forum for crypto firms and policy groups to argue that the US is keeping Bitcoin outside the banking core even as it talks about innovation.

The result is more ETF-style access for investors, but still limited adoption on bank balance sheets.

The black swan is that the draft goes beyond the market’s fears, or the debate around it gets captured by national security or AML concerns in a way that hardens the prudential case against Bitcoin rather than softening it.

Then the focus becomes a strategic US decision to keep Bitcoin largely on the edge of the regulated banking system.

This Fed proposal could decide how banks treat Bitcoin: as bankable infrastructure or as balance sheet contamination.

That is why this seemingly dry Fed vote matters more to Bitcoin’s long-term banking integration than most investors realize.